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PHYSICIAN DISCIPLINE:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR A NATIONAL POLICY
by Oren L. Zeve*
I. A PREEXISTING CONDITION
The American electorate has a short institutional memory.1
If an individual were to have the apparent memory lapses the
voters collectively display, a series of diagnostic medical tests
would be appropriate to identify the causes of the problem. No
tests can be performed on the national psyche as a whole,
however; politicians may prefer it that way, particularly at election
time.
The electoral politicking over health care policy as one of
the ills that plague America's citizens is an instance of this
memory loss. Medical malpractice, the rising costs of medical
care, and the lack of and under-insurance of millions of people
affect lives every day, with consequences not just for individuals,
but for society as a whole. An institutional amnesia, however, has
caused the public to forget the observation made even ten years
ago that the "health care crisis has been with us for a considerable
*. PhD candidate, University at Buffalo - Department of Philosophy.
Thanks are owed to Leslie Darman, Richard T. Hull, George Kannar, and Ellen
V. Weissman, and especially to Aiko Bennett for her support over the years.
1. See, e.g., Jack Germond &Jules Witcover, Republicans' 'Stature Gap' Talk
is Nonsense, ATLANTA J. & CONST. Dec. 20, 1991 at A:16. "[The public's
being pulled this way and that way by conflicting or competing values isn't
simply an occasional occurrence but instead a fundamental, recurring
characteristic of opinion on a wide range of policy questions." DAVID
YANKELOVICH, COMING TO PUBLIC JUDGMENT: MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK
IN A COMPLEX WORLD 32-33 (1991) (quoting Ten Years of Public Opinion: An
Ambivalent Public, PUBLIC OPINION Sept-Oct 1988 at 21).
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
time now. "' The federal government in Washington has been
aware of the "crisis" in health care for four decades,3 and in the
2. Philip C. Kissam, Government Policy Toward Medical Accreditation and
Certification: The Antitrust Laws and Other Procompetitive Strategies, 1983
WISCONSIN LAW REv. 1, 21 (1983). Professor Kissam's article provides an
excellent description of medical credentialing for both the novice and expert.
It would be difficult at best to approach the topic of this article without being
familiar with his analysis.
3. The mainstream media have reported consistently on the "health care crisis"
as a concern for national lawmakers. The Nixon White House wrestled with the
problem early in its first administration. Leone Baumgartner, Health Care
System - A Sick but Curable Patient, N.Y. TIMES, December 20, 1969, at 30;
Richard D. Lyons, Administration Seeks Short-Run Gains in Nation's Medical
System, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 12, 1970 at 19; Richard D. Lyons, Some Democrats
Laud Nixon Plan, N.Y. TIMES Feb 20, 1971, at 28. The 1976 campaigns
included conflicts within the Republican party as to the best solution, Where
Ford and Reagan Stand on Issues - In Their Own Words, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, March 1, 1976 at 16, and President Carter continued to hear from the
ranks of business during his administration. A.F Ehrbar, A Radical Prescription
for Medical Care, FORTUNE, February 1977, at 3; Regina Herzlinger, Can We
Control Health Care Costs?, HARVARD BUSINESS REV., Mar./Apr. 1978, at
102.
After nearly four years of President Reagan's tenure in office, health
care was a topic for both business and medical interests. The New Health Care
Crisis Must Be Faced, BUSINESS WEEK, December 26, 1984, at 222; 1984
Presidential Candidates' Health Care Platforms, HOSPfrALS, J of the Amer.
Hosp. Ass'n, Sept. 1, 1984; Linda E. Dernkovich, Businesses Drive to Curb
Medical Costs without Much Help from Government," 16 NAT'L J. 1508 (1984).
The Clinton administration wants a comprehensive plan, the Health Security
Act (HSA), to address the majority of the problems faced by the health care
system. See WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, HEALTH SECURITY:
THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1993); see also Health
Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. Ist Sess. (1993).
Even before the United States existed, health care was regulated by
government. See R. Scott Jones, Organized Medicine in the United States, 217
ANNALS OF SURGERY 423-24 (1993) (describing colonial laws from 1639 and
the mid-1700s). There probably has never been a time in the United States
when a health care concern of some sort did not exist for the government.
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politics of health for most of the century.4
Coverage and payment reform, regardless of whether they
involve the current system of multiple insurers or movement
toward a single-payer,5 fail to address a perhaps more
fundamental question. The individuals who provide health care
services must be qualified to treat their patients. Attention has
been paid to the opportunity to choose a provider, but it must also
address the quality of physicians and the allied health professionals
themselves.6
Although the number of applications to medical school has
recently increased,7 only twenty-five years ago the profession was
4. See generally, JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR
PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOvERNMENT at 257-61 (1990)
(summarizing national health proposals before and after the world wars); Al
Gordon, Health Care - From Truman to Clinton, NEWSDAY, Oct. 18, 1993 at
41; Jonathon Greenberg, Give 'em Health, Harry, NEW REPUBLIC, October 11,
1993.
5. Contrary to the political claims that a reform of health care payment systems
at the federal level will lead to "socialized medicine," the oft-cited examples of
the medical systems in Great Britain and Canada have significant differences.
The former operates with doctors employed by the government for the provision
of care, while in the latter the government is the source of the ultimate payment,
as a "single-payer system." Proponents of a single-payer system advocate
adoption of this Canadian model, not the British program. Robert Dreyfuss, The
Big Idea, MOTHER JONES May/June 1993, at 18,22. See also Carol Gentry, A
Prescription for Understanding Health Care Reform, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1993 at 10A; Trudy Lieberman, Focus on Healthcare: A Handbook for
Journalists, 32 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 37 (1993).
6. The Clinton proposal raises quality of care as a goal of the system. The
plan asserts that the Health Security Act will improve quality by developing
"guidelines for effective medical care for specific conditions and illnesses,"
WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 61, while
simultaneously claiming not to "second-guess decisions made by doctors and
their patients." Id. at 62-3.
7. Medical School: Applications Rise for 4th Year, WASHINGTON POST, Nov.
10, 1992 at Z5; The Week in Healthcare, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 4, 1993,
at 16.
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"wounded" by "dissatisfactions, diffidence, [and] ethical decay. "I
Professional dissatisfaction developed in part from a rapid
increase in liability in the field of medical malpractice, which
distracted physicians from the self-adopted responsibility of
treating illness.9 While the current debate about the economics of
health care includes the consequences of what some call a
malpractice "crisis,"10 it focuses much more on affordability in
health care than on quality.II
Medical malpractice claims have served for many years as
society's most aggressive public response to monitoring
incompetent doctoring. Economic reformers target the malpractice
system as a prime scapegoat for the upward spiral in the cost of
medical care. 1 One conclusion that can be drawn from
8. Bernard J. Ficarra, Legal Medicine: The Auxiliary to Bioethics, in LEGAL
MEDICMNE 203 (C.H. Wecht, ed., 1992).
9. One physician has claimed that the medical profession suffers from "an
infection.., named consumer-driven, profit-oriented capitalism." R. Scott Jones,
Organized Medicine in the United States, 217 ANNALS OF SURGERY 423, 428
(1993)(emphasis omitted). "[I]f capitalism invades a profession that is supposed
to be looking after sick people as its primary goal, that profession will get sick.
That is exactly what has happened." Id. See generally, Edmund D. Pellegrino,
The Medical Profession as a Moral Community, 66 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED.
221 (1990).
10. See e.g., Roger D. Blair & Marvin Dewar, How to End the Crisis in
Medical Malpractice Insurance, CHALLENGE, Mar/Apr 1988, at 36.
11. See Erik P. Eckholm, Less Cost vs. Less Care, N.Y. TimES, Sept. 20 1993,
at Al; Ruth Simon, A Flawed Remedy: Managed Care, MONEY, April 1993,
at 114. But cf. Lu Ann Aday, Equity, Accessibility and Ethical Issues: Is the
U.S. Health Care Reform Debate Asking the Right Questions? 36 AMER. BEHAV.
SCI. 724 (1993).
12. The threat of malpractice increases costs by forcing doctors to require
additional tests in order to prevent second-guessing of their diagnosis and course
of treatment. Julie Kosterlitz, Paying for Miracles, 26 NAT'L J. 1967 (1993)
("tests of dubious value"); Merrill Goozner, Health Care Puzzle: More is Less,
CHICAGO TRmUNE, July 8, 1991, at 1-C (discussing "defensive medicine"). But
see Kenneth Jost, Defensive Medicine: Cost Savings Uncertain, ABA J., May
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malpractice litigation is that some physicians, "a small
percentage," lack basic competence, while others are unprepared
to undertake specific procedures.13 Thus, if the advocacy for
America's health security includes quality of care as a
requirement, action must be taken to preserve a community of
competent physicians.
In 1986, Otis R. Bowen, secretary for Health and Human
Services, testified before a congressional committee on malpractice
reform that a significant step toward reform would include
"thorough and comprehensive state surveillance" of physician
competence. 14 Congress periodically considers legislation
pertaining to medical personnel, but traditionally the states have
regulated through their police powers physicians and other
practitioners, as well as aspects of health care such as insurance
companies.15 The states have served as the primary regulators of
the profession through two parallel institutions: the courts as the
forum for trying medical malpractice cases, and the physician
licensing and discipline boards specifically charged with
administrative control.
1993 at 71. The Health Security Act would eliminate the liability of physicians
who have followed the appropriate practice guidelines. See WHrrE HousE
DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 3, at 79; see also Health Security Act
§5312 (creating a pilot program). Likewise, the skyrocketing costs of
malpractice insurance have driven otherwise-qualified practitioners out of their
chosen fields, particularly obstetrics. See Federal Incentives for State Health
Care Professional Liability Reform Act of 1985: Hearings on S1804 Before the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)
[hereinafter Federal Incentives]; Gary Spencer, Cuomo Urges Malpractice No-
Fault Fund, N.Y.L.J., June 21, 1991 at 1.
13. Federal Incentives, supra note 12, at 597 (statement of Otis R. Bowen,
secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
14. Id. at 598.
15. "Although federal [quality-of-care] activities are more pervasive and receive
more attention... [o]ne cannot discuss... basic issue[s]... without acknowledging
state jurisdiction." Adrienne Lang, The Influence and Activities of Government
on Quality of Care, 30 INT'L ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICIAN, Spring 1992, at 57.
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Given the focus on revamping health care financial policy
at the national level, it seems appropriate to ask whether other
aspects of the system should be addressed at that level. Neither
the standards nor the ability of a physician to practice medicine
depends on his respective state; the human body is the same
everywhere.16 While the process of regulating doctors has
remained with the states, there is a growing recognition that state
disciplinary and medical boards are notoriously bad at assuring the
qualifications and competence of medical professionals. 7
Opponents of federal involvement in health policy insist that
health care must remain the responsibility of the states."8
Individual states retained the authority to regulate this subject in
the federal system in the Constitution, particularly through the
Tenth Amendment.19 However, the rigidity of this view neglects
the fact that "the federal government is the only player with a
16. The most prominent federal initiative connecting quality and incompetence,
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§11101-11152
(1988), encourages the use of "explicit, more nationally uniform criteria to
examine patterns of care and patterns of outcomes." Stephen F. Jencks & Gall
R. Wilensky, The Health Care Quality Improvement Initiative: A New Approach
to Quality Assurance in Medicare, 268 JAMA 900 (1992).
17. Physician Discipline: Can State Boards Protect the Public?: Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy of the
Committee on Small Business, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) at 2 (introductory
remarks of Rep. Ron Wyden, subcommittee chairman) [hereinafter Physician
Discipline]. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW (1986).
18. In the current health insurance debate, the Hawaiian program of universal
coverage is proffered by opponents of federal intervention as an example of state
success. See William F. Buckley, Jr., What Happened to Federalism?,
NATIONAL REVIEW, Nov. 16, 1992, at 71. Yet, Hawaii has several social
characteristics which may make the example unwarranted. See generally Bill
Turque, et.al., Experimental States, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1993 at 39.
19. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST., amend. X.
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national mandate and national constituencies of both providers and
patients;" and physicians must "try to work with it rather than
against it. "20
This article will look at physician licensing and discipline
in the American constitutional system. Part II surveys the main
methods of initially credentialing physicians: state licensing and
medical board certification. The third section contends that views
restricting federalism to a bright line rule in the Constitution
should be rejected. The Constitution represented a deliberate
movement towards a more national government, notwithstanding
its "federalist" labelling. Finally, some proposals for greater
involvement by Washington in eliminating incompetent physicians
will be considered in Part IV. 1
H. LICENSE LICENTIOUSNESS?
Physician licensing practices date back several centuries.2
Europeans adopted them as early as the Middle Ages; variants
existed across the several nations. Although England first
implemented related laws in 1511, the practice did not initially
cross the Atlantic to the colonies. Over time, the individual
colonies initiated regulations of their own. In one case, a state
20. Lang, supra note 15, at 70. See also Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger,
Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients or Society? (A Case Study in
Federalism), 61 N.Y.U.L.REv. 1, 87 (1986) ("not whether the states or federal
government has responsibility.., but rather that someone must").
21. "Only a few disciplinary actions by State Boards appear to stem from
outright incompetence or careless work... [but] we simply don't know the true
extent of inferior medicine being practiced today or the impact it may have on
patient care." Federal Incentives, supra note 12, at 599 (statement of Otis R.
Bowen).
22. ROBERT C. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1969). The historical material here comes from chapter 1
of this book. See also STANLEY J. GROSS, OF FoxEs AND HENHOUSES:
LICENSING AND THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS ch. 4 (1984).
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directed that university-trained physicians could charge higher rates
for medical services than their apprenticed counterparts. By the
end of the nineteenth century, every state engaged in some sort of
licensing process, usually requiring an examination of applicants.
Despite the long history, the propriety of physician
regulation still stirs debate.23 The object of licensing should be
a determination that a particular individual is competent to engage
in the practice of medicine.24 "The rationale for state regulation
in this area is the patient's inability to safeguard his own interest...
[s]ince the patient has no means to evaluate his physician's
competence. "I Ample evidence dispels that rationale; licensing
serves the interests of physicians and they, like other professionals,
actually seek out the protection state regulation can provide.26
One author has flatly suggested that "licensing fails to assure its
legitimate purpose of furthering competence and honesty on
service. ' 21 Even if an "initial license" does offer guidance to
consumers on competence, a public health official has noted that
23. See e.g., GROSS, supra note 22, at 3 ("[L]icensing... has become worse
than the problem it is said to address"); Elizabeth Graddy, Interest Groups or
the Public Interest -- Why Do We Regulate Health Occupations? 16 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & LAW 25 (1991) (assessing the impact of regulation on health
professionals); Jaclyn Faglie Low, Another Look at Licensure: Consumer
Protection or Professional Protectionism? 46 AMER. J. OCCUPATIONAL
THERAPY 373 (1992).
24. See Donald G. Langsley, Medical Competence and Performance
Assessment: A New Era, 266 JAMA 977 (1991) (outlining various methods of
evaluating practitioner skills).
25. FRANK P. GRAD & NOELIA MARTI, PHYSICIANS' LICENSURE AND
DISCIPLINE 55 (1979). See also GROSS, supra note 22, at 16-19 ("public
welfare purposes").
26. See Low, supra note 23, at 373 ("a lack of documentation of consumer
protection" but "evidence of self-serving"); GROSS, supra note 22, at 19-20
(offering the advantages to various occupations that desired state licensing).
27. GROSS, supra note 22, at 3.
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there is no "guarantee that every physician will maintain the
needed knowledge and skills" over time.28
Licensing and certification are the two ways to identify
physicians who possess the requisite knowledge and skills to
practice medicine.29 State boards of medical examiners require
minimum education and skill-training levels before they will
license medical practitioners.30  Most states demand that
physicians-to-be graduate from an "accredited" medical school,
pass a now-uniform national exam, and participate in a residency
31program. In addition to these educational criteria, personal
28. Alfred Gellhorn, Periodic Physician Recredentialing, 265 JAMA 752
(1991)(emphasis added). Gellhorn, who chaired the New York State Advisory
Committee on Periodic Physician Recredentialing, observed that the need for
maintenance of knowledge has "tempered [the medical profession's] objection
to the concept" of recredentialing. Id. at 752.
29. Most of the medicine in the United States, however, is practiced by lay
people engaged in such simple pursuits as taking an aspirin or bandaging a cut.
Regulation of this "practice" of medicine would be entirely unworkable,
although some might argue that no drug, even aspirin, should be available as
over-the-counter medication. See Robert M. Veatch, Federal Regulation of
Medicine and Biomedical Research: Power, Authority, and Legitimacy, 75 THE
LAW-MEDICINE RELATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATION 9 (Stuart F.
Spicker, Joseph M. Healey Jr., & H. Tristan Engelhardt, eds., 1981).
30. Licensure operates as only one method of state regulation. Other less
restrictive controls include certification, which is different from specialty
certification in the medical field, and registration. Graddy, supra note 23, at 26.
31. See Kissam, supra note 2, at 8. In December 1993, a single test, the
United States Medical Licensing Examination, replaced the previous collection
of exams, which included one specifically for graduates of foreign, or non-U.S.,
medical schools. See Alton I. Sutnick, Marie L. Shafron, & Marjorie P. Wilson,
Impact of the New United States Medical Licensing Examination on the
Certification Process of the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical
Graduates, 31 INT'L J. OF DERMATOLOGY 798 (1992). Foreign medical
graduates encounter special difficulties in obtaining licenses to practice in the
U.S. See generally, Arthur Osteen, Licensure and International Medical
Graduates, 266 JAMA 956 (1991).
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background is also considered.32 Receiving a license to practice
from the state confers legal authority to engage in the
profession."
Certification, like licensing, provides a modicum of
information to others, including the fact that an individual meets
minimum standards set by others in the profession or specialty.
Organized boards of physicians have developed separately from the
states' credentialing programs, and in some cases, the physician
boards are as powerful as licensing agencies.35 The American
Board of Medical Specialties, the umbrella organization for
specialty boards, currently includes twenty-four member boards. 36
The specialty boards branch into subspecialties that certify over
seventy areas of practice.37
32. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvICES, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE 2 (1986). A hospital hiring
committee may consider many additional details that may impact on the
relationship to the hospital, such as locations of both home and office, before
granting full institutional privileges. See generally GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 175-82 (5th ed. 1993).
33. "Licensure restricts the scope of practice, making it illegal for an
unlicensed person to perform the service." Graddy, supra note 23, at 26. But
see GRAD & MARTI, supra note 25, at 54-55 (suggesting the purpose of
licensure as related to discipline).
34. See Kissam, supra note 2, at 55. For a more complete comparison of these
two processes across several health occupations, see DENNIS S. FALK, NEIL
WEISFELD, & DAVID TOCHEN, PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH OCCUPATIONAL
CREDENTIALING: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR HEALTH
CERTIFYING AGENCIES 7-22 (1979).
35. Private credentialing programs are subject to antitrust laws. See Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); see generally Kissam, supra note
2, at 2-4, 55-63.
36. Jones, supra note 9, at 426. Boards have been in existence since 1916. Id.
37. Alma R. George, Physician Certification, 83 J NAT'L MED'L ASS'N 857
(1991). The development of the numerous subspecialties forced the ABMS to
reemphasize the qualifications represented by a "general certificate" that signals
Physician Discipline
Both licensing and certification have drawbacks. In the
opinion of some, licensing offers an opportunity for members of
the profession to restrict others from practicing and thus to assure
non-competition.38 While no one would suggest that incompetent
physicians be allowed to practice, today licensing itself does not
necessarily prevent that from occurring. The statutes of the late
1800s and early 1900s targeted "quackery, commercial
exploitation, deception, and professional incompetence," but do not
fulfill that role today.39 Consequently, licensing may simply
overall competence, inclusive of subspecialties, and that is granted by a
specialty board. Id. The majority of the specialty boards issue a "time-limited"
certification which must be renewed periodically in order to maintain the status.
See Task Force on Recertification, Time-Limited Certification and
Recertification: The Program of the American Board of Internal Medicine, 114
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 59 (1991) [hereinafter Task Force] (announcing the
board's new policy); see also George, supra, at 857 (outlining the certification
process generally).
38. "By their very nature, licensure restrictions are anticompetitive." Shirley
V. Svomy, Physician Licensure: A New Approach to Examining the Role of
Professional Interests, 25 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 497, 507 (1987). See generally
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM chap. 9 (1962); and ALAN L.
SORKIN HEALTH MANPOWER: AN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 79 (1977). Sorkin
describes Reuben A. Kessel's proposal which focuses on medical skill "outputs,"
as opposed to "inputs": allow anyone to take the exam, regardless of training,
and then engage in periodic testing for licensure renewal. Id. at 79 (citing
Kessel, The AMA and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 267 (1970). When professional groups establish credentialing
programs,"the observed consequences always seem to be these two: the
exclusion of certain groups, whether by intention or not, and the establishment
of mediocre performance standards." James Fallows, The Case Against
Credentialism, ATLANTIC MONTHLY December 1985, at 49, 64 (quoting a
business consultant).
39. Low, supra note 23, at 373 (quoting R. Roemer, Health Service
Developments: Their Impact on Regulation and Functions of Rehabilitation
Personnel, ARCHIVES OF PHYSICAL MEDICINE AND REHABILITATION 183
(1980)).
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function to drive health costs higher with no appreciable return for
40the expense.
More radical critiques of licensing have charged that the
system creates a "monopoly" for an elite few to define "disease,"
"sick," and the proper course of treatment.41 While the system
does have supporters,42 the growing complexities of medical
practice and the need for physician accountability triggered the
certification of physicians by the various specialty boards,43 an
alternative to the less than "optimal" present conditions.'
Certification should replace licensing because it provides roughly
the same amount of information while increasing free choice in the
market for various medical services. 45  This process is not
immune to abuse, however.
Certification of medical professionals applies in several
areas of health care. Medical schools are all accredited or
regulated by the American Medical Association (AMA) as well as
40. Id. Many routine medical procedures can be performed by non-physicians,
such as nurse practitioners, midwives or physician's assistants, while doctors
remain in the background in the event their more specialized skills are required.
41. GEORGE J. ANNAS, et al., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW, at 673 (citing IVAN
ILICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS (1976)). A recent move by the National Institutes for
Health to establish an Office of Alternative Medicine may increase the attention
paid to nontraditional American providers as reputable sources for diagnosis and
treatment. See Anastasia Toufexis, Dr. Jacobs' Alternative Mission, TIME,
March 1, 1993 at 43.
42. See ANNAS, id.
43. Task Force, supra note 37, at 59.
44. Graddy, supra note 23, at 45; see also Shirley Svorny, Should We
Reconsider Licensing Physicians?, 10 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 31(1992).
45. Svorny, supra note 38, at 497. Certification normally requires equal or
more stringent requirements than licensing. See Blair & Dewar, supra note 10
(suggesting revisions to the licensing system as a solution to the malpractice
crisis). See also Langsley, supra note 24, at 997-8.
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by the Association of American Medical Colleges.46 The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(controlled by the AMA, the American Hospital Association, and
the professional colleges of both physicians and surgeons) regulates
the accreditation of hospitals.47 Most specialists, as well as the
"paraprofessionals" (e.g., nurses or chiropractors), certify
members of their respective communities.
These private accreditation organizations convinced many
state legislatures that licensing should be coordinated with their
private activities. It is no coincidence that both the AMA and the
states require accreditation of medical schools.48 Many hospitals,
furthermore, require specialty board certification before extending
full privileges to a physician.49 This has created an incestuous
credentialing process as the different certifiers work with each
other in setting their standards.
All the private systems suffer from an "inherent conflict of
interest" that can harm consumers by affecting quality and cost.50
Mutual standardization may cause a less-than-ideal situation.5"
One consequence may be education and residency standards that
46. See Kissam, supra note 2, at 8, 34.
47. Id. at 9.
48. See generally, KENNETH M. LUDMERER, LEARNING TO HEAL: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION (1985).
49. See POZGAR, supra note 32, at 175-78 (listing employment considerations
for hospital governing boards); but see 42 C.F.R. § 482.12(a)(7) (privileges may
not be "dependent solely upon certification, fellowship, or membership in a
specialty body or society").
50. Kissam identifies three types of conflicts: (1) the public interest vs. private
economic interests in preventing competition; (2) the public interest vs. the
provision of the best possible care; and (3) the public interest in impartial
decision making vs. prevailing scientific/medical paradigms. Kissam, supra note
2, at 20-1.
51. See id. at 22-3 (concluding that "ideological and technological factors" may
influence more than economics).
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have an "unnecessary uniformity." Other problems include the
possibility of reductions in competition among non-discrete
specialty providers and over-utilization of health care services.52
The interplay between licensure and certification has not
resolved the fundamental difficulty of establishing a policy that
will not simply identify capability but also prevent incompetence.
Licensure, and its potential revocation, should encourage doctors
to "behave in a manner consistent with patients' interests. "I The
medical examiners who can revoke or suspend a license or
mandate other discipline for wayward doctors frequently do not
revoke it, even in some of the more egregious cases. 54 One
medical consumer advocate has suggested that, in New York
alone, over ten thousand incompetent doctors may be practicing
medicine regularly on unsuspecting patients. 55 Thus, unless one
advocates abolishing physician licensing entirely, the practice
represents an accepted, basic step in creating and maintaining a
pool of qualified doctors.
52. Id. at 12-18.
53. Svorny, supra note 38, at 499. At the same time, patients, as consumers,
should be prepared themselves to ask the questions necessary to identify good
doctors. See Rita Rubin, When and How to Challenge Your Doctor, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. May 10, 1993 at 63.
54. See generally Physician Discipline, supra note 17; Tim Friend, Diagnosing
Bad Doctors, AMERICAN HEALTH 11 (November 1990) (discussing a
compilation of 6892 "questionable doctors" who still have licenses).
55. Physician Discipline, supra note 17, at 5 (testimony of Laura Wittkin,
executive director of Stop Hospital and Medical Error, Inc. (SHAME)). But see
Norton Spritz, Oversight of Physicians' Conduct by State Licensing Agencies:
Lessons from New York's Libby Zion Case, 115 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
219 (1991) (criticizing the disciplining of two doctors under a faulty procedure).
Cf. Joseph Post, Medical Discipline and Licensing in the State of New York: A
Critical Review, 67 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 66, 95 (1991) ("there is urgent
need for reform").
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III. RED, WHITE, AND BLUE CELLS
The current system, which relies on the states to license
and to discipline, has major gaps in achieving the policy goal of
preserving quality care in medical practice. Although after-the-fact
review of medical decisions does not assure quality care at the
time of service, it offers a method for checking the actions of
doctors.5 6 Bad doctoring may be the product of any number of
factors. Both physical and mental illness as well as substance
abuse affect a physician's skills. Treating these problems often
requires a response other than license revocation. s7
Disciplinary systems should respond to competency
concerns but are often ineffective because state boards have been
under-funded and understaffed. Another problem involves the lack
of uniformity across the states. Various states require slightly
different license requirements. Licensed physicians frequently are
authorized to practice in a second jurisdiction via reciprocity laws,
or endorsement.5 8 Revocation of that same license in one state
does not automatically affect privileges in another, so doctors can
travel from one state to another. Sanctionable behavior in one
jurisdiction may be ignored in another. s9
56. Cf. Lang, supra note 15, at 69. Lang distinguishes between "quality
assurance" as an error and correction process, and "improvement" as
"prospective behavior modification." See also John L. Glover, Quality
Assurance and Medical Stupidity, 57 AMER. SURGEON 475 (1991) (peer review
does nothing to "benefit patients," but effective methods desirable).
57. Richard D. Blondell, Impaired Physicians, 20 PRIARY CARE 209 (1993).
Suspension pending treatment may be appropriate when a doctor has the
necessary skills but is temporarily unable to exercise them.
58. See generally, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, U.S. MEDICAL
LICENSURE STATISTICS AND CURRENT LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS (1990).
59. Kathleen L. Blaner, Comment: Physician, Heal Thyself: Because the Cure,
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, May Be Worse than the Disease, 37
CATH. UNIV. LAW REv. 1073, 1079 (1988). See generally, Physician
Discipline, supra note 17.
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Development of national standards, both to authorize and
discipline practitioners, would appear to be logical. Federal
attempts to address some of these issues inevitably run into the
charge that these regulatory operations are the responsibility of the
states.' With changes in the economy and the need for a
coherent health care policy, a more aggressive federal role could
help to resolve lingering problems. Thus, developing a federal
policy for physician discipline includes two preliminary
considerations. First, one must understand the context for the
creation of the federal system;6 and second, one should relate
the values of American federalism to the current status of health
care policy.
A. A Healthy Constitution
Many theoretical approaches to comprehending the
American federal system have been propounded over the years.
Daniel Elazar examines federalism "in the broadest sense of the
term" as an "animating and informing principle of the American
political system," an "integral federalism." '62 This approach
60. "The difficulty, from a Federal standpoint, and I used to teach
constitutional law, is that the protection of the health and the welfare have been
reserved by the 10th and lth Amendments to the Constitution." Physician
Discipline, supra note 18, at 23 (testimony of Health and Human Services
Inspector General Richard Kusserow). But see Physician Recertification:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Ways and
Means. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (a proposal to place Medicare physician
re-licensure under federal control) [hereinafter Physician Recertification].
61. When considering the founders' arguments for federalism, one should keep
in mind Michael G. Collins' observation that "[i]n The Federalist itself, any
word resembling 'federalism' is missing." Whose Federalism?, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 75, 84 (1992)
62. Daniel J. Elazar, Our Thoroughly Federal Constitution, in How FEDERAL
IS THE CONSTITUTION? 43-44 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra,
eds., 1987).
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rejects a variety of voguish views throughout American history that
persist as the primary avenues for popular and even professional
understanding of the Constitution. 63
Faced with the failures of the Articles of Confederation,' 4
the Philadelphia convention developed a "non-centralized"
structure to manage the concerns of all. 5 The need for a
stronger national government "was inevitable if there were to be
any union at all ... "I The Constitution of the United States of
America, the product of the 1787 convention, incorporated a
mixture of both national and federal components.67 All the
delegates to the constitutional convention advocated a stronger
63. See id. at 43. These unhelpful interpretations, in Elazar's view, include
"intergovernmental relations" as offered by 20th century "managerial
perspectives," the "distribution of powers" advocated by lawyers, and the "grand
political struggle" of the states' rights historians of the 19th century. Id. at 43-
44. "[M]ost contemporary definitions of federalism are little more than
generalized descriptions of... divid[ing] governing power between the states and
the central government." Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism:
"Neither a National nor a Federal Constitution, but a Composition ofBoth", 86
YALE L.J. 1273 (1977).
64. See generally, GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969). "The belief that the 1780's, the years after the
peace with Britain, had become the really critical period of the entire Revolution
was prevalent everywhere during the decade." Id. at 393.
65. Elazar, supra note 62, at 56-57. Non-centralization differs from
decentralization in the former's assumption "that there is no central authority as
such," and that power and authority exist at different levels. Id. at 56-57. The
federal structure of the Constitution would thereby "check despotic tendencies...
in both the larger and smaller governments, while preserving the principle of
popular government." Id. at 56.
66. Id. at 52.
67. As James Madison contended, the "proposed Constitution, therefore, .. .is,
in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of
both." THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 39, at 246 (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
1993
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
national government.6" Some, like Alexander Hamilton, insisted
on complete elimination of the states as separate entities.69 The
finished document reflected a political compromise among the
various parties, however.70
The basic elements of the government are more apparent
than precise in the language of the Constitution. Even though the
federalist structure of the nation is "crystal clear," the balance and
locus of power are "ambiguous."71 James Madison recognized
the difficulty of this imprecision as he supported the plan.
Inaccuracies in language that resulted from the complexity of the
proposed government affected the convention's ability to
"delineat[e] the boundary between the federal and State
jurisdictions."72 From this tumultuous beginning, the venture "to
form a more perfect Union"'73 has "tried unsuccessfully for nearly
68. FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 185-87 (1985). Indeed, the states themselves
had to be willing to "relinquish major elements of their sovereignty to create a
stronger and more effective national government ..." Robert M. O'Neil, The
Separation of Powers in a Federal System, 37 EMORY L.J. 539, 556 (1988).
69. See MURRAY FORSYTH, UNIONS OF STATES: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF CONFEDERATION 61-2 (1981); RICHARD B. MORRIS, WITNESSES AT THE
CREATION: HAMILTON, MADISON, JAY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 18, 209
(1985).
70. See John C. Hueston, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention:
The Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and
Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765 (1990). As early as 1819, only thirty years
after ratification, the authority of the national government was affirmed by the
Supreme Court. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See
also William Jeffrey, Jr., The Constitution: "A Firm National Government", in
How FEDERAL IS THE CONSTITUTION? supra note 62, at 21-22, 30 (disputing
"any division whatever of governmental power.")
71. Elazar, supra note 62, at 41.
72. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 37, supra note 67, at 229.
73. U.S. Const. pmbl.
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200 years... to determine precisely how far and how fast we wish[
to take ourselves away from the ramshackle, disarticulated hyper-
federalism of the Articles of Confederation. ,4
B. Antibodies and Antinomies
"[T]he case of the patient is carefully examined;.., they are
unanimously agreed that the symptoms are critical," wrote
Madison of the problems the United States faced.7' While none
doubted the importance of changing the Articles, Madison found
that the Constitution's opponents could not agree among
themselves on either the problems the document posed or an
alternative prescription.76 Even today, the appropriate division
between state and federal governments is no less a political venture
than at the time the Constitution was originally debated."
74. David M. Kennedy, Federalism and the Force of History, in How FEDERAL
IS THE CONSTITUTION? supra note 62, at 69. See also MICHAEL KAMMEN, A
MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTrrUTION IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 311-12 (1986) (recounting the federalism theme of the Constitution's
sesquicentennial); American Federalism: the Third Century, 509 ANNALS 9
(1990).
75. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 38, supra note 67, at 234.
76. Id. at 235. Madison himself remained "ambivalen[t] about various
constitutional issues," such that he made "contradictory utterances on different
occasions." KAMMEN, supra note 74, at 57-8.
77. For a discussion of Anti-Federalist opposition, see generally, JACKSON
TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-
1788 (1961). Recent commentators range from explicitly political to scholarly
ventures. See generally, BARRY GOLDWATER, THE CONSCIENCE OF A
CONSERVATIVE (1960); Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to National
Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise of American Federalism, 16 HARVARD J. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 129 (1993); Daniel J. Elazar, The New Federalism: Can the
States Be Trusted?, 35 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 89 (1974). In twentieth century
political terms, the objections come from individuals that view federalism as
preventing the rise of explicitly socialist policies in America. Frank J.
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Rather than offering a rule of law to be applied from case
to case, federalism represents a collection of values that are
necessarily flexible for the role of governance.7" Federalism
values are mixtures of both political and managerial tendencies.
The political features of the Constitution's design assist in the
protection of individual liberty.79 Maintaining several levels of
government provides opportunities for more citizen involvement in
self-government. The system simultaneously prevents factions and
less mainstream groups from dominating other citizens, because
Thompson, New Federalism and Health Care Policy: States and the Old
Questions, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 647, 648 (1986) (citing T.J.
Lowi, Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? A Federal Analysis, in
THE COSTS OF FEDERALISM (R.T. Golembiewski & A. Wildavsky, eds., 1984).
To the extent that modem criticisms of federal over state action rely on an
originalist approach, they neglect the pervasive uncertainty of the period as to
the meaning of the Constitution. "No issue involving constitutional
interpretation during these decades [following ratification and the Bill of Rights]
was more delicate or persistent than the nature of the federal Union in general
and the problem of state sovereignty in particular." KAMMEN, supra note 75, at
51. See also Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
78. Cf. Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League
of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 81; David M. O'Brien,
Federalism as a Metaphor in the Constitutional Politics ofPublicAdministration,
49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 411 (1989). See also James Edwin Kee & John
Shannon, The Crisis and Anticrisis Dynamic: Rebalancing the American Federal
System, 52 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 321 (1992) (suggesting that a crisis, e.g., war,
increases demands for national action); James L. Sundquist, American
Federalism: Evolution, Status, and Prospects, 19 URB. LAW. 701 (1987) (an
"unceasing... debate and political struggle" with controversies that "exploded in
a constitutional crisis").
79. Liberty is enhanced by the diffusion of power among several centers of
authority. See Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of
National Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694, 1699 (198 1)[hereinafter Taking Federalism
Seriously]; Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and Individual Liberties, 40
VAND. L. REV. 1353 (1987).
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the former are more likely to be restricted to regional or smaller
levels.80
On the managerial side, a federal system enables the
smaller governmental entities to establish programs that meet a
particular region's more selective needs." Sensitivity and
responsiveness to constituents' concerns have a basic political
component in their legitimizing effects on government. The
necessity for increased responsiveness in turn provides an
opportunity for experimentation, with a variety of programs
simultaneously meeting similar needs at different locations.'
Favored by the rise of administrative agencies as primary sources
of governance, managerial components animate current approaches
to understanding and analyzing federalism.83
The managerial and political values do not function as
attributes that are independent from each other within the
80. Taking Federalism Seriously, supra note 79, at 1700. See also ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN
THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM (1980).
81. Id., Taking Federalism Seriously.
82. Id. See also Thad L. Beyle, The Governor as Innovator in the Federal
System, 18 PuBLius 131 (1988). The now-classic statement of this position
comes from Justice Brandeis: "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11
(1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). Regional experimentation also decreases the
likelihood that "a boring sameness" will envelop the nation. Taking Federalism
Seriously, id.
83. See JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: How PUBLIC LAW
DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 243-44 (1989). Federalism is "now characterized as
more costly, less effective, less responsive, and less accountable." Laurence J.
Aurbach & Ross D. Davis, Federalism for the Third Century?, 19 URB. LAW.
445 (1987). Federal administrative action also presents a problem for analyzing
preemption of state laws. See generally, Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr. & Carter
G. Phillips, Federal Preemption: A Comment on Regulatory Preemption after
Hillsborough County, 18 URB. LAW. 589 (1986).
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Constitution. They mutually affect and reinforce the role of
democratic governance in the United States.' The political
considerations of federalism, in conjunction with the democratizing
pulls of the electorate, play an important role in health care
policy. 5 Attempts to develop a workable health policy within the
84. At the same time he was defending the nationalizing structure of the
Constitution, Madison asserted that the separation of powers within the national
government's "three great provinces" -- legislative, executive, and judicial --
would endure an "obscurity" that would "puzzle the greatest adepts in political
science." THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 37, supra note 67, at 228. One of the
more controversial Supreme Court cases on federalism, supported the principle
that federalism is a function of the nation's very structure. The protected
sovereignty of the states lies "in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power...." Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985). Through this shape,
"restraints on federal power over the States inhere principally in the workings
of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the
objects of federal authority." Id. at 552. The dissenting "defenders" of
federalism rejected any reliance on a coequal branch's authority: "Nor is so
much as a dictum of any court cited in support of the view that the role of the
States in the federal system may depend upon the grace of elected federal
officials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this Court." Id. at
560-1 (Powell,J., dissenting). Cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976)(overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528 (1985)); and Fry v. U.S., 421 U.S. 542 (1975). See also Carol
Lynn Tebben, Is Federalism a Political Question? An Application of the
Marshallian Framework to Garcia, 20 PUBLIUS 113 (Wint. 1990). At issue in
Garcia was a federal labor law's application to a state governmental entity. The
core concern of this article is the subject matter for federal regulation, and it is
to that question that managerial and political considerations apply. Congress
may not violate other constitutional provisions in implementing its policies,
however.
85. See, e.g. MORONE, supra note 4, at 253-4. The health care changes in the
mid-1960s shared many attributes with the programs President Franklin
Roosevelt adopted in the 1930s to lift America out of the Depression. President
Lyndon Johnson "was a true disciple on the New Deal. And what, after all,
was the Great Society but a Texas-style version of the New Deal turned loose...
on the conquest of poverty, deprivation, and suffering in all their still-lingering
forms?" ELLIOT RICHARDSON, THE CREATIVE BALANCE: GOVERNMENT,
POLITICS, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY 125 (1976).
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country are predominantly managerial, however. Despite the
misperception of public attention, the states have recently been
initiating more aggressive responses in their own policies.8 6 Yet
"no serious scholar in the field" advocates the development of a
"non-centralized approach to health policy."87  The two recent
major initiatives from Washington have emphasized a more unified
national plan for health policy."8
Federal law already is aimed at the "increasing occurrence
of medical malpractice and the need to improve the quality of
medical care [that] have become nationwide problems that warrant
greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual
State. "89 More federal involvement in the plans and processes of
physician licensing and discipline may be a necessary step to
assuring a pool of quality physicians. If no explicit constitutional
86. See Turque, et.al., supra note 18. But see Russell L. Hanson, Defining a
Role for States in a Federal Health Care System, 36 AMER. BEHAV. SCI. 760
(1993) (a "patchwork of programs" continues questions about equity).
87. Thompson, supra note 77, at 647. The gaps between state and federal
governments in terms of the "commitment, capacity, and progressivity" in health
policy have declined, but "substantial variation" remains a concern. Id. at 665.
88. President Ronald Reagan's "New Federalism" would have placed Medicaid
at the national level, alongside its companion program Medicare, while returning
other welfare programs to the states. See Irving Louis Horowitz, From the New
Deal to the New Federalism, 42 AM. J. OF ECON. AND SOC. 129 (1983).
Horowitz raised several federalism values in discussing his overall concerns
about the plan. Id., 146-7. The Clinton plan obviously shifts much of the health
care agenda to the national level. A major Clinton theorist, Alice Rivlin,
supports a process similar to the Reagan program. See Alice M. Rivlin, A New
Vision of American Federalism, 52 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 315 (1992). She
would shift social insurance, including health, to the federal government while
a "productivity agenda" -- education, work skills, and infrastructure -- would be
transferred to the states. Id. See also ALICE M. RIvLIN, REVIVING the
AMERICAN DREAM: The ECONOMY, THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT (1992); Robert M. Solow, Dr. Rivlin's Diagnosis & Mr. Clinton's
Remedy, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 25, 1993, at 12.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1) (1988).
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barrier prevents federal action on the subject, then the question
remains as to whether the values of federalism support the
development of a national licensure system, or whether Congress
should utilize alternative means to ensure a competent community
of physicians.
IV. CURING FEDERAL LAW
A. Doctors in the House and Senate
Efforts at more extensive federal involvement in physician
regulation tend to flounder in congressional committees and never
reach the floor of either house. Legislation introduced in recent
years covered various aspects of licensing and discipline, including
fraud, discrimination against foreign medical graduates, and state
residency concerns.' Another bill recommended recertification,
on a national level, of physicians involved in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs through periodic reexamination." The author
90. H.R. 2113, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (fraud); H.R. 2092, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989) (fraud); S. 2934, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (licensing and
discipline generally); S. 475, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (discrimination); S.
2515, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (discrimination); H.R. 196, 103d Cong, 1st
Sess. (1993) (fees and disciplinary boards). See also GRAD & MARTI, supra note
25, at 110-12 (describing S. 3585, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)). Compare this
approach with Grad and Marti's recommendation for disciplining physicians in
light of the nature of the policy interest violated, generally either protection of
health and safety or economic exploitation. Id. at 7. The area of economic
exploitation has achieved greater significance; regulations were developed to
limit Medicare reimbursements for physician referrals to labs that they owned.
42 C.F.R § 411.350 (1992).
The federal government has not chosen to establish a licensing system
for its own employees, adopting instead licensure in any state system as a
prerequisite to employment. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1094 (1988) (armed forces
physicians, dentists, psychologists, nurses, and others as specified).
91. H.R. 4464, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Most current federal law on
licensing relates to the Medicaid and Medicare programs. These programs
served as a catalyst for more federal interest in the health care credentialing
VOL. XIII
1993 Physician Discipline
of the bill recognized that "it is easier to deny an incompetent
physician a new license, than it is to remove one."' In lieu of
accepting these bills, two new bodies have been established to
study the issues and to advise policy makers.93
Congress has responded to some problems through the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA). 4 This
legislation encouraged professional self-discipline through
increased involvement of peer review organizations (PROs) in the
assessment of physicians and responded to personal liability
concerns stemming from the review process. 95 The act also
mandated reporting requirements for state medical boards and
PROs, as well as parallel provisions imposing a duty to inquire on
the part of hospitals.' The information collected under the
process. Blaner, supra note 59, at 1087. Federal law in this context excludes
physicians from participating in programs if their licenses have been revoked or
suspended by a state, as well as by committing fourteen other acts listed in the
statute, including fraud, drug conviction, patient abuse, loan default. 42 U.S.C.
§1320a-7 (1988).
92. See Physician Recertiflcation, supra note 60 at 4 (statement of
Representative Pete Stark).
93. Health Professions Education Extension Amendments of 1992, Title III,
P.L.No. 102-408, 106 Stat. 1992 (1992). The Advisory Council on Graduate
Medical Education assists the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
Congress on questions of supply, distribution and education of physicians. The
National Advisory Council on Medical Licensure advises the Secretary on
licensing and credentialing concerns.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 11101-52 (1988).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 11111-15 (1988). HCQIA extended immunity from suit to
individuals who testify before and who judge in the PRO process. "The real
essence of HCQIA is the immunity it affords." Karen Sandrick, Two Years and
Running, HosPrrALS, February 5, 1993 at 44 (quoting Ila Rothschild, assistant
general counsel for the American Hospital Association).
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11132-37. But see Michele Saludo & Rebecca Blumenstein,
Medical Examiner: Probe Doc Jointly, NEWSDAY Oct. 22, 1993 at 28
(dangerous physician employed because data bank check not mandatory).
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auspices of HCQIA is entered into the National Practitioner Data
Bank (NPDB). 7 Hospitals can use the information contained in
the data bank as one factor on which to base a credentialing
decision.98
Early assessments of the HCQIA legislation recognized
several gaps. PROs exhibit a broad failure in identifying
substandard practices by physicians.99 The act does not require
reporting of all adverse information, excluding for example
disciplinary sanctions under thirty days.'" Similarly, first- year
information indicates that licensure actions appear to be
underrepresented in the NPDB because of the act's limited
reporting requirements.10' Variations persist from state to state
97. 42 U.S.C. § 11131-37 (1988). The data bank is not limited to information
regarding physicians. See G. Birkholz, Implications of the National Practitioner
Data Bank for Nursepractitioners, 16 NURSE-PRACTTIONER 40 (August 1991).
A consumer-driven guide to questionable physicians was developed in 1990 by
the Public Citizen Health Research Group. INGRID VANTUINEN, PHYLLIS
MCCARTHY & SIDNEY WOLFE, 9479 QUESTIONABLE DOCTORS DISCIPLINED BY
STATES OR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1990).
98. Sandrick, supra note 95, at 45. Hospital administrators see a report's
contents "merely as a red flag" which "duplicate[s] information hospitals collect
in other ways." Id.
99. Haya R. Rubin, et al., Watching the Doctor-Watchers: How Well Do Peer
Review Organization Methods Detect Hospital Care Quality Problems, 267
JAMA 2349 (1992) (study finding a twelve percentage point difference in
identifying questionable care). Compare Evelyn M. Kuhn, et al., The
Relationship of Hospital Characteristics and the Results of Peer Review in Six
Large States, 29 MEDICAL CARE 1028 (Oct. 1991) (linking resources, training,
and equipment to quality of care assessments).
100. See Sandrick, supra note 95, at 45 (doctors bargaining for lighter
sanctions).
101. See Fitzhugh Mullan, et al., The National Practitioner Data Bank: Report
from the First Year, 268 JAMA 73, 76 (1992). The Federation of State Medical
Boards, which also tracks disciplinary acts, estimated twice as many reports as
the NPDB files indicated. The latter registers only discipline concerning
medical conduct directly.
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in defining inappropriate behavior, thus potentially relevant,
sanctionable behavior may not be listed. Reporting also
includes potentially extraneous data that do not always reflect on
competence, such as malpractice payments.0 3
If achieving a qualified, nationwide community of
physicians is a top priority for the country -- the interest in
obtaining quality uniformly is certainly strong" 4 -- then the lack
of coordination among the states should yield to the broader
demand, irrespective of the health insurance reform outcome."0 5
Proposals inevitably crash headlong into the criticism that the
states will see such efforts as an ominous attempt to create
"Federal medical licensure... [even if] prompted by the best of
intentions.""°6 Yet the concerns of these critics sound more like
102. Blaner, supra note 59, at 1079; Christopher S. Morter, The Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find Peer Review More
Inviting? 74 VA. L. REv. 1115, 1139 (1988).
103. "The relationship between malpractice payments and culpability is far less
certain than that which exists between adverse actions and medical
incompetence." Mullan, supra note 101, at 73, 78.
104. Comparably, the availability of a specific service varies from state to state,
but there is no apparent "rationale to justify restriction to those residents in other
states who may be unwell." Susan Bartlett Foote, Comment, in FEDERALISM:
STUDIES IN HISTORY, LAW, AND FEDERAL POLICY 75-76, (H.N. Scheiber, ed.,
1988).
105. A proponent of state licensing condemned the results fourteen years later
as "'provincialism run riot.'" Each state created its own systems, apart from all
the others. Derbyshire, supra note 22, at 151 (quoting William Osler,
AEQUANIMirrAS 276 (1944). One author has suggested that a movement towards
some aspects of regulatory consistency has already taken place within the states'
court systems. In private malpractice litigation, specialty-certified physicians
must demonstrate medical care equivalent to that provided elsewhere by
similarly certified colleagues. Edward N. Beiser, Medical Care, Public Policy,
and Contemporary Federalism, in FEDERALISM, supra note 104, at 63, 68-9.
106. Physician Discipline, supra note 17, at 32 (statement of James R. Winn,
executive vice president, Federation of State Medical Boards of the United
States, Inc.). See also id. at 21 ("perceived by some as an initial effort to shift
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stagnant conceptions of federalism as a bright line rule of law,
rather than federalism as a principle for the role of governance.
By focusing on the interconnected responsibilities between the state
and federal governments, federalism values can help to shape the
policy that is implemented.
B. Alternative Treatments
Section A discussed legislation, both enacted and proposed,
that came from both parties in Congress. Thus, Democrats and
Republicans share the desire for reform. The remaining dilemma
is identification of the policy that best accounts for the political
and managerial values of federalism. What follows are sketches
of three alternative plans, highlighting the pros and cons of each.
1. Nationalization
Under one policy option, the federal government could
mandate across-the-medical-board consistency in licensing and
discipline by developing and implementing federal guidelines." °
This can be done without preempting all state law."0 8 First, a
the focus to a federal system," Peyton E. Weary, president, American Board of
Medical Specialties). Medical community opposition to national licensing over
traditional state powers may only reflect a purely self-interested motivation.
Medical malpractice litigation and insurance, equally a traditional state
responsibility with licensing, should be regulated federally according to the
AMA. See Federal Incentives, supra note 12, at 189.
107. Kissam recommends a federal agency that would engage in accreditation
of training programs and credentialing of practitioners on the basis of innovation
and quality. Kissam, supra note 2, at 84.
108. When the national government acts, it may be preempting, via the
Supremacy Clause, state regulation of these same areas. "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof.., shall
be the supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2. The question
often involves a careful look at the state and federal laws in question, including
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national policy need only be for physicians, not for other health
professions. 1" Second, balancing traditional state interests in
licensing practices can be accomplished by allowing, for example,
experimentation with alternative health care providers such as
midwives, physician extenders, or holistic and homeopathic practi-
tioners. 10
The significant advantage of this proposal is the opportunity
to stabilize the discipline and sanction process for licenses
nationwide, a quality goal that is highly desirable. Standards for
discipline would be similar everywhere in the country. Suspension
or revocation of a license would bar employment anywhere in the
country for the appropriate period. From a managerial viewpoint,
however, federal responsibility makes little sense.
Funding and personnel for these operations would be
removed from state auspices. Federal boards would assume
responsibility for case processing, but they would need to be
geographically stationed to assure responsiveness and effectiveness.
Placing disciplinary boards in every state but identifying them as
federal entities replicates the system currently in place in many
the intent of the legislatures. A state law that explicitly conflicts with a federal
one will be nullified, but the substantiality of the conflict is not always apparent.
Where two laws can coexist, however, the search involves locating an intent on
the part of the federal government to occupy the entire field and thereby to
exclude all state regulation. See Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy
Resources Conservation Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
109. Cf. Kissam, supra note 2, at 84 (proposing an alternative federal plan for
physicians and physician specialists). Kissam adds that limiting the program
may also serve administrative and political considerations. Id.
110. Cf. id., supra note 2, at 84-85 (implementing "not new regulation but for
a new competition between federal, state and private regulatory systems"). See
generally Q. W. Smith, C. E. Fasser & J.D. Holcomb, Credentialing by
Legislative Fiat: Implications for the Allied Health Professions, 20 J. OF ALLIED
HEALTH 157 (1991) (allowing unlicensed physicians to serve as physician's
assistants); Note, The Legal Status of Physician Extenders in Iowa: Review,
Speculations, and Recommendations, 72 IOWA L. REV. 215 (1986). Other
regulations might address working conditions, such as hours, procedures or
equipment.
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ways, without the advantage of proximity to the population for
basic legislative policy decisions. Thus a national licensing and
discipline policy seems to create the most extensive disruption of
the current structure.
2. Interstate Restriction
A second possibility for federal involvement would be to
sanction, either civilly or criminally, physicians crossing state
borders in order to practice in another state while they have
affected licenses. The act of crossing a state border is the classic
basis for federal legislation under the Commerce Clause.'11 A
policy on these grounds does not undermine current federalism
notions as much as the policy suggested in subsection one.
Consequently, even the ardent supporters of bright line federalism
could prescribe a national policy under these conditions.
This approach leaves the current state system completely
intact and avoids a major disruption in licensing and discipline
procedures. It targets directly those individuals whose records are
unacceptable. Unfortunately, it minimizes potential gains in
establishing higher quality nationwide because it ignores state-by-
state inconsistencies and other problems. Another drawback
develops under due process concerns: physicians who switch states
while under investigation. In New York, for example, disciplinary
proceedings are closed until a final determination is made.12
Unless the policy extends to barring individuals who are merely
under investigation from crossing state lines to continue practicing,
a constitutionally dubious proposition, a large class of individuals
could avoid any consequences.
111. U.S. CONST., art. 1 §8.
112. See Doe v. Office of Professional Medical Conduct of the New York
State Department of Health, 81 N.Y.2d 1050, 601 N.Y.S.2d 573, 619 N.E.2d
651 (1993).
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3. Suspension Reciprocation
A third version of federal policy mandates that license
suspensions and revocations automatically be reciprocal. This
approach would be tied immediately to state laws. Most states
maintain endorsement provisions for granting out-of-state license
holders an equivalent credential. When a license is revoked or
suspended in one state, however, a parallel action in another may
not occur for a variety of reasons. These include cost, basis of
initial sanction, or lack of information about the earlier discipline,
arguably less a concern with reporting under the HCQIA.
A reciprocity-based policy has an advantage in its
continuity with state responsibility for health and safety regulation.
It maintains and reinforces the present role of the states. Aside
from basic procedural requirements and perhaps some substantive
concerns, states would have a relatively free hand in drafting
legislation. Like the first policy option mentioned, reciprocity
would provide more stability across the country, even though some
states might not themselves focus on identical acts as
inappropriate. Federal implementation, furthermore, could be
through an indirect process that conditioned state receipt of federal
funds on the adoption of the provision. 3
Discipline reciprocity would eliminate the delays and
disinterest of sister states by triggering an interstate suspension or
revocation, but it would maintain local responsibility. This policy,
furthermore, would extend a comparable constitutional cornerstone
to medical licensing: the Full Faith and Credit Clause." 4
113. The policy promoted must be related to the spending program to which it
is attached. See South Dakota V. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (conditioning
federal highway funds on state's minimum drinking age constitutional despite
Twenty-first Amendment). Cf. GRAD & MARTI, supra note 26, at 10 (it is
"possible and desirable" to use conditions on the receipt of federal funds).
114. "Full faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST., art. IV §1.
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Although the relevant provisions of the clause apply to acts,
records, and judicial proceedings, extension of the idea to licensing
boards seems worthwhile.1 15
V. THE FOLLOW-UP VISIT
Assuring that treatment will be provided, regardless of a
person's income or wealth, offers little improvement in the health
of the citizens if the doctors should not be practicing at all.
Physician discipline is just one area in which new ideas need to be
developed in order to combat a long-standing problem. Provided
above are a few ways of thinking about discipline issues in the
context of the U.S constitutional structure. Proactive federal
policies to establish a qualified community of medical practitioners
inevitably will tread upon traditional notions of state sovereignty;
however, federal legislation need not replace state authority. A
politically and economically viable conception of federalism must
distinguish between extremes at both the hyper-federal and
centralized interpretations of state-federal structure and work
toward effective public policies.
115. "Indeed, there are few clauses of the Constitution, the merely literal
possibilities of which have been so little developed as the full faith and credit
clause." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 16, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 870 (1987).
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